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Available online 15 September 2011AbstractBackground: An outbreak of Acinetobacter baumannii in neurological intensive care unit was detected, causing nosocomial infection on 6 cases
and colonization on 5 cases.
Methods: Five major clones of A baumannii circulating in the intensive care unit were detected by pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). The
outbreak was controlled by aggressive intervention with disinfection of equipments and environment, and audit of hand-washing practice by the
staff in this intensive care unit.
Results: The A baumannii could be isolated from equipments and the environment, including the chart folders 5/8 (62.5%), work trolley 1/2
(50.0%), ambulance bag of patient 1/3 (33.3%), hands of healthcare-workers 7/22 (31.8%), surfaces of monitors 1/4 (25.0%), bottle of suction
fluid 1/4 (25.0%); but not isolated from the hands of healthcare-workers after disinfection with wash practice.
Conclusions: Different strains of A baumannii may cause infection, exist in medical environment, and colonize the patients at the same time. It
may develop into true infection anytime. We conclude that hand hygiene as well as disinfection of equipments and the environment are the two
most important factors to control and prevent the outbreak of A baumannii.
Copyright  2011, Taiwan Society of Emergency Medicine. Published by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
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Acinetobacter baumannii is a Gram-negative coccobacillus
that is found in many hospital environments and can be isolated
from the skin and feces of healthy populations.1 A baumannii
can proliferate in wet conditions and survive in a poor envi-
ronment for as long as 13 days on the surface of a completely dry
substance.2 It is a low-virulence organism that has rarely caused
invasive diseases in the past, but has emerged as a clinically* Corresponding author. Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of
Internal Medicine, Shin Kong Wu Ho-Su Memorial Hospital, 95 Wen Chang
Road, Shih Lin District, Taipei 111, Taiwan.
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doi:10.1016/j.jacme.2011.07.003important nosocomial pathogen in recent years, especially in
critically ill patients.3e5 Underlying conditions associated with
A baumannii bacteremia include alcoholism, burns, malignancy,
intracranial hemorrhage, and trauma.6,7 A baumannii causes
nosocomial infection in patients with pneumonia, septicemia,
endocarditis, meningitis, brain abscess, lung abscess and urinary
tract infection.3,8
In nosocomial infection and outbreaks, the major trans-
mission route of A baumannii is contact transmission, either
directly from the hands of healthcare workers or indirectly via
environmental colonization.9 Most outbreaks are caused by
contamination from mechanical ventilators, central venous
systems and invasive procedures.10e12 A baumannii has been
isolated from gloves, water, intravenous fluid, monitors andMedicine. Published by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
Fig. 1. Monthly infection rate of A baumannii from February 2002 to August 2003.
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operations, the use of steroids and invasive procedures.3,8MostA
baumannii infections are acquired in hospital and are directly
proportional to the length of hospital stay, especially in the
intensive care unit.9 The most common primary site for A bau-
mannii bacteremia is the respiratory tract.13,14 The presentation
of this organism can range from colonization and self-limiting
infection to serious life-threatening pneumonia and septi-
cemia, especially in critically ill patients.13e16
An A baumannii outbreak causing pneumonia, urinary tract
infection, soft tissue infection, catheter-related infection and
bacteremia was detected by our routine surveillance system in
the neurological intensive care unit (NICU) in Shin Kong Wu
Ho-Su Memorial Hospital, Taiwan. In this study, we used
molecular methods to investigate this event and implemented
strict infection control measures to control the outbreak.
2. Materials and methods2.1. BackgroundAn infection control and surveillance system was established
in 1992 in Shin Kong Memorial Hospital, a 961 bed medical
center in Taipei, Taiwan. The definition of nosocomial infection
was guided by the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance
System.17 Increasing numbers of infectious cases of A bau-
mannii were detected by our routine surveillance system in
NICU in the 7 months from August 2002 to February 2003
(Fig. 1). During the outbreak, 11 cases of A baumanniiTable 1
The infectious rate of patients in pre-outbreak, outbreak and post-outbreak
Nosocomial A baumannii infection case Total admi
Pre-outbreak 2 137
Outbreak 11 155
Post-outbreak 1 138
a Compare between pre-outbreak and outbreak; p ¼ 0.045.
b Compare between outbreak and post-outbreak; p ¼ 0.027.nosocomial infection were found. The endemic rate for A
baumannii as a direct cause of hospital-acquired infection in our
NICU before this outbreak was 1.52/1000 patient-days, whereas
during the outbreak it was 6.94/1000 patient-days ( p ¼ 0.045).
The endemic rate returned to 0.76/1000 patient-days after the
outbreak (Table 1). During the outbreak, contact precautions
were applied to all patients with infection or colonization of A
baumannii. A microbiological survey of patients, equipment,
healthcare workers’ hands and the environment was done
during the outbreak and any episode of infection caused by A
baumanniiwas included. The surveillance of patients continued
until discharge from NICU or no further clinical infection was
detected. The incidence of A baumannii infection returned to
normal after these 7 months (Fig. 1).2.2. Bacterial isolatesSampling of specimens taken from patients, equipment, the
environment and the healthcare workers’ hands was done
during the outbreak. A total of 46 cultures were obtained from
the environment, including resuscitation bags, suction fluid
bottles, surfaces of respirator monitors, aerosolizing water for
ventilators, the blades of intubation scopes, the surfaces of
monitors, computer keyboards, chart folders, work trolleys,
telephones, and cleaning wipes. The healthcare workers’ hands
were sampled twice at an interval of 2 weeks. Cultures were
obtained from doctors, nurses, respiratory therapists, assistants,
and cleaning staff by washing their hands with 50 mL of
normal saline.ssion cases Admission days Incidence/1000 patient-days (&)
1320 1.52
1584 6.94a
1315 0.76b
7C.-H. Huang et al. / Journal of Acute Medicine 1 (2011) 5e102.3. Antimicrobial susceptibilityAll isolates obtained for surveillance purposes were iden-
tified by the API 20 NE system. (API-BioMe´rieux, LaBalme
Les Grotles, France) Antibiotic susceptibility was tested in the
clinical microbiology laboratory by the standard disc diffusion
method, according to the recommendations of the Clinical
and Laboratory Standards Institute.18 Susceptibility tests were
done for gentamicin, amikacin, isepamicin, minocycline,
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, levofloxacin, ciprofloxacin,
ticarcillin/clavulanate, piperacillin, pipracillin/tazobactam,
aztreonam, ceftazidime, cefepime, imipenem/cilastatin and
meropenem.2.4. Pulse-field gel electrophoresisPulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was used to examine
the 26 available preserved isolates of A baumannii (some
cultures had no bacterial growth). The pure bacterial cultures
were embedded into plugs, placed into EC buffer (6 mM
Tris, 1 M NaCl, 0.1 M EDTA, 0.2% sodium deoxycholate,
0.5% sarkosyl, pH 8) for 4e5 hours, then incubated with
50 mL proteinase K (20 mg/dL) overnight at 50C. DNA was
extracted and purified were done by standard procedures, and
digested by the restriction endonuclease SmaI. The restriction
fragments were separated by PFGE in a CHEF unit (CHEF
Mapper XA System, Bio-Rad Laboratories) using 0.5  TBE
buffer (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Beverly, MA, USA) at 12C,
6 V/cm, with a switch time of 5e20 seconds for 22.5 hours
and a Lambda Ladder PFG Marker (Biolab Laboratories,
Beverly, MA, USA) as molecular mass marker. Interpretation
of the PFGE types followed the description by Tenover et al19
Similar PFGE patterns of the isolates were considered to be
closely related isolates if the number of fragment differences
was 3.2.5. Statistical analysisRoutine surveillance of nosocomial infection was done in
each intensive care unit in our hospital to detect abnormally
increased numbers and rates of infections compared to the
infection rate over the previous 6 months. Any increased
infection rate compared to the average rate for 6 months was
discussed by the infection control committee and an outbreak
was defined as an infectious rate significantly ( p < 0.05)
above the endemic rate. Data were assessed by independent
samples t tests (SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL, USA).
3. Results3.1. Epidemiology investigation of the outbreakBefore the outbreak, there had been only two cases of
pneumonia and eight cases of colonization of A baumannii
in the previous 6 months. However, during the 7-month
outbreak, there were seven cases of pneumonia, one case of
urinary tract infection, one case of soft tissue infection, onecase of catheter-related infection, and one case of bacteremia.
The infection rates for the 6 months prior to the outbreak, the
outbreak and 6 months after the outbreak were compared.
The p values were 0.045 for outbreak versus pre-outbreak and
0.027 for outbreak versus post-outbreak (Table 1). During the
outbreak, samples from all patients with infection in the
intensive care unit until discharge or 2 months after transfer
were cultured.3.2. Containment measuresIntervention in this intensive care unit was started after the
increased infection rate was reported. The microbiological
surveillance revealed A baumannii colonized on environ-
mental surfaces and healthcare workers’ hands. Thereafter,
infection control methods, including strict daily environmental
cleaning with 0.05% NaOCl, effective sterilization of reusable
medical equipment, attention to proper hand hygiene,
cohorting and isolation, were implemented by our infection
control nurses.3.3. Bacterial analysisCultures of 46 samples from the environment and 44
samples from the healthcare workers’ hands were done twice
during the outbreak. Thirty isolates of A baumannii were
preserved, ten from patients and 20 from surveillance cultures.
Of the preserved isolates, 26 could be retrieved for PFGE
(some failed to grow), including seven from patients, 12 from
the environment and seven from the healthcare workers’
hands. In addition to A baumannii, Enterobacteriaceae,
staphylococcus, streptococcus and glucose non-fermenting
Gram-negative bacilli were isolated from the surveillance
cultures. A baumannii was isolated from 62.5% (5/8) of chart
folders, 50.0% (1/2) of work trolleys, 33.3% (1/3) of resus-
citation bags, 31.8% (7/22) of healthcare workers’ hands
before handwashing practice, 25.0% (1/4) of the surfaces of
respiratory monitors, 25.0% of suction meters (1/4), 25.0% of
suction fluid bottles (1/4), 25.0% of aerosolizing water for
ventilators (1/4), and 25.0% of the surfaces of central monitors
(2/8). No A baumannii was isolated from healthcare workers’
hands after handwashing practice was begun (Fig. 2).
PFGE showed five outbreak strains, types AeE, and another
six epidemiologically unrelated strains, types FeK, were
detected only in the environmental surveillance (Table 2).
Case 1: the first case of strain type A was in a patient with
a cerebral vascular accident who was transferred from the
ordinary ward because of respiratory failure. Positive sputum
cultures of A baumannii were found 1 month before the
outbreak and in pus/wound during the outbreak. Case 2:
Strain type Awas isolated from the sputum 1 week later. Case
3: Strain type B was isolated from the sputum. Case 4: Strain
type B was isolated from a work trolley and the hands of
nurse A. Strain type C was isolated from the sputum of Case
4, the aerosolizing water of Case 4, nurse B, and the chart of
Case 6. Strain type D was isolated from the urine of Case 5
and the sputum of Case 6 (10 days after Case 5), the
Fig. 2. A baumannii colonization in the environment and on healthcare
workers’ hands.
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and the hands of nurse C. Strain type E was isolated from the
central monitor and suction bottle of Case 3, the sputum of
Case 7 and the hands of nurse E.
PFGE showed five outbreak types of A baumannii in
patients and the environment. Drug susceptibility was
analyzed in all of the isolates, and several different patterns
were found (Table 2).Table 2
Drug susceptibility and pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) types of the isolate
Strain Source of isolates Specimen PFGE type GM
1 Case 1 Pus A S
2 Case 2 Sputum A R
3 Case 3 Sputum B S
4 Nurse A Hands B S
5 Case 4 Trolley B S
6 Case 4 Sputum C R
7 Nurse B Hands C R
8 Case 4 Aerosolizing water C R
9 Case 6 Chart C R
10 Case 8 Chart C1 R
11 Case 5 Urine D R
12 Case 9 Central monitor D R
13 Case 6 Ambulance D R
14 Case 8 Central monitor D R
15 Case 6 Sputum D R
16 Nurse C Hands D R
17 Nurse E Hands E R
18 Case 3 Central monitor E R
19 Case 3 Suction bottle E R
20 Case 7 Sputum E R
21 Nurse D Hands F S
22 Case 3 Suction monitor G R
23 Case 10 Chart H S
24 Nurse F Hands I S
25 Case 9 Chart J S
26 Nurse G Hands K S
AN¼ amikacin; ATM¼ aztreonam; CAZ¼ ceftazidime; CIP¼ ciprofloxacin;
PIP¼ piperacillin; R¼ resistant; S¼ sensitive; TZP¼ piperacillin/tazobactam.4. Discussion
The infection and transmission of emerging pathogens,
including A baumannii, have increased in most hospitals in
recent years.3,5,7,9 The frequency of nosocomial infections
with A baumannii is increasing; clone transmission and
outbreaks are emerging and there are ongoing problems in
many hospitals, especially in intensive care units.5,12 Coloni-
zation can lead to clinical infections, including bacteremia,
pneumonia, urinary tract infections, soft tissue infections and
surgical site infections.
Outbreaks result in prolonged hospitalization and increased
costs, so it is important to investigate and stop outbreaks
quickly to prevent increased morbidity, mortality and costs.
Interventions include emphasis on infection control, promo-
tion of hand hygiene, daily disinfection of all equipment and
surfaces of monitors, use of disposable saline and drug bottles
and aggressive cleansing of all surfaces in contact with
patients and healthcare workers. These interventions were
monitored by infection control nurses in this intensive care
unit for several months.
The colonization rate on hands decreased dramatically after
strict handwashing practice. Colonization of any bacteria on
hands was 91% (20/22) before handwashing practice and
decreased to 13.6% (3/22) afterward. In addition, A baumannii
was isolated from 7/22 hands before handwashing practice and
none after; handwashing decreased the rate of colonization of
A baumannii and other bacteria (Fig. 2). Enterobacteriaceaed A baumannii
PIP CAZ ATM TZP CIP IPM FEP AN
R R I I R S I S
R R I I R S I R
I S I S S S S S
S S I S S S S S
S S I S S S S S
S S I S S S S R
S S R S S S S R
S S I S S S S R
S S I S S S S R
S I I S I S R I
R R R R R S R R
R R R R R S R R
R R R R R S R R
R R R R R S R R
R R I S R S I R
R R I R R S R R
I S R S S S S R
I S R S S S S R
I S R S S S S R
I S R S S S S R
I S I S S S S S
I S R S S S S R
S S I S S S S S
S S I S S S S S
S S I S S S S S
I S I S S S S S
FEP¼ cefepime; GM¼ gentamicin; I¼ intermediate; IPM¼ imipenem;
Fig. 3. Pulse-field gel electrophoresis patterns of the A baumannii isolates. 1:Case 1, pus 10:Case 8, chart 19:Case 3, suction bottle. 2:Case 2, sputum 11:Case 5,
urine 20:Case 7, sputum. 3:Case 3, sputum 12:Case 9, central monitor 21:Nurse D. 4:Nurse A 13:Case 6, ambulance 22:Case 3, suction monitor. 5:Case 4 work
trolley 14:Case 8, central monitor 23:Case 10 chart. 6:Case 4, sputum 15:Case 6, sputum 24:Nurse F. 7:Nurse B 16:Nurse C 25:Case 9, chart. 8:Case 4, aerosolizing
water 17:Nurse E 26:Nurse G. 9:Case 6, chart 18:Case 3, central monitor.
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water-containing equipment and hands. Gram-positive bacilli
and enterococci were isolated from dry surfaces of various
monitors. Nevertheless, A baumannii could be isolated from
any available specimen; and could be preserved on moist and
dry surfaces of equipment, water and hands. Therefore,
decontamination and disinfection of the environment and
equipment were used to contain this outbreak and to prevent
another outbreak in this unit.
A total of 11 different PFGE types of A baumannii were
detected in the patients and environmental surveillance
during this outbreak, but only five types (AeE) that were
isolated from our patients were responsible for this outbreak
(Fig. 3). Strain type A might have been transmitted from Case
1 to Case 2, resulting in soft tissue infection in Case 1, and
pneumonia 1 week later in Case 2. Strain type B caused
a lower respiratory tract infection in Case 3 and was colo-
nized on the hands of nurse A and a work trolley in Case 4.
Strain type C might have been colonized in the aerosolizing
water of Case 4, resulting in pneumonia. Strain type C was
detected also on the hands of nurse B and on the charts of
Cases 6 and 8. Strain type D caused a urinary tract infection
in Case 5 and pneumonia 10 days later in Case 6. Strain type
D was also found colonized on the ambulance of Case 6, the
central monitors of Cases 8 and 9 and the hands of nurse C.
Strain type E caused pneumonia in Case 7 and colonized on
the central monitor and suction bottle of Case 3. Different
strains could colonize on equipment and in the environment
and be transmitted by healthcare workers’ hands. We found
epidemiologically unrelated strains (types FeK) in the
environment. Although they were not pathogens in this
outbreak, they could have caused another outbreak or infec-
tion later. Routine disinfection of the environment and
continuous education of all staff (nurses, doctors, respiratory
care workers and cleaners) are important. Different isolates
had different drug sensitivities and different PFGE types.
They are impossible to differentiate on the basis of suscep-
tibility alone. Molecular methods have recently become thegold standard for typing in outbreak investigations. The
sources of outbreaks might be overlooked or misidentified
without molecular evidence.
5. Conclusions
An outbreak is big challenge for hospitals and doctors and it
might be the first sign of an emerging infection or development
of new drug resistance. Evidence of microorganisms was used
to verify the existence of this outbreak, which was interrupted
by disinfection, handwashing practice and other interventions
provided by infection control nurses. The disinfection of
equipment, environment cleansing, and persistent promotion
of hand hygiene are important in the control and prevention of
outbreaks. Surveillance of nosocomial infections should be
continuous in any hospital and offers opportunities to predict
and prevent outbreaks. Emergency departments and intensive
care units are both special care units. Doctors and healthcare
workers might be too busy to adhere to proper hand hygiene
practices. In addition, emergency departments tend to be
crowded, which provides a good opportunity for A baumannii to
colonize and circulate. Strict contact precautions and vigorous
environmental cleansing are mandatory to prevent transmission
of this pathogen.
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